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Abstract  
We undertake an analysis of regulatory consistency using a database of publicly available regulatory decisions 
in Australia.  We propose a simple exploratory model which allows us to test for regulatory consistency across 
jurisdictions and industries without detailed knowledge of the regulatory process.  We compare two measures 
using our approach--the weighted average cost of capital and the proportion of firms’ revenue requirement 
claims disallowed by the regulator.  We advocate use of the second measure, but our empirical results may be 
interpreted as indicating that a range of measures ought to be considered when assessing regulatory 
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Consistency is generally deemed to be a key principle of good regulation.
1 It is also often 
demanded by regulated businesses.
2 Although no general definition of regulatory 
consistency exists, it usually means a requirement for equitable treatment; different firms 
under identical conditions regulated by different regulators should expect to be treated in 
the same way.  
 
An important issue, and the starting point of this paper, is that there does not seem to be a 
clear articulation of how one should measure consistency. The approach followed in 
legislation often seems to rely on ensuring that particular regulatory parameters are the 
same.  For example, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) parameters that will 
apply to all electricity distribution businesses across Australia for regulatory proposals 
submitted between 01 April 2009 and 01 April 2014 will be identical ‘unless there is 
persuasive evidence provided in individual distribution proposals that justify a 
departure’
3 from the standard rate set by the regulator.   
 
Without detailed knowledge of the regulatory process, an outside observer may be 
tempted to equate consistency of specific regulatory parameters such as the WACC with 
regulatory consistency.  This focus could be rationalised by the view that the WACC is 
based on the firms’ capital requirements, which can be objectively assessed. This view, 
however, can be misleading as it ignores the discretionary nature of the choice of the 
WACC and other regulatory parameters by the regulator.  
 
Consider, for example, two identical firms that are assessed by different regulators. It is 
clear that the regulatory decisions should yield the same return on capital. Suppose 
                                                 
1 See, for example, statements available 
at http://www.dfes.gov.uk/hegateway/uploads/principles_good_regulation.doc, http://www.finance.gov.au/
obpr/proposal/coag-requirements.html, and http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/13/40395187.pdf.  
2 See, for example, Energy Retailers Association of Australia (2003), Australian Logistics Council (2006), 
and National Insurance Brokers Association of Australia (2007).  
3 See, Australian Energy Regulator (2008), p. 5. further that the WACC parameters are identical across the two decisions but there are two 
different methodologies for setting the regulated asset base. In this simple example, 
identical WACC parameters will result in inconsistent returns on capital. This example 
highlights that regulators typically set both the WACC and other regulated parameters 
simultaneously. This is different from the role that the WACC plays in unregulated 
markets where the value of assets is determined by the market. Therefore, using the 
WACC to measure regulatory consistency might be misleading. 
 
Perhaps the focus on specific parameters such as the WACC is understandable; it is easier 
to compare the WACC across decisions than to compare more multi-dimensional criteria 
such as asset valuation methods.  However, as the example above illustrates, focusing on 
the WACC as a measure of regulatory consistency may be misleading.  This observation 
provides one motivation for this paper, namely, to provide an alternative measure of 
regulatory consistency which has the advantage of being one-dimensional but avoids the 
disadvantage of focusing on a single parameter such as the WACC.  
 
We propose to measure consistency as the proportion of firms’ revenue requirement 
claims disallowed by the regulator when determining the maximum revenue.  This 
measure aggregates a wide variety of inputs into the regulatory process and also focuses 
on a concrete outcome which both the firm and the regulator care about.  This measure 
also has the advantage of not requiring any detailed knowledge of how the regulatory 
decision was arrived at. 
 
A second motivation for this paper is to propose an approach for testing regulatory 
consistency across jurisdictions and industries.   We do not specify a model of the 
regulatory decision-making process, but take an econometric approach which allows for, 
but does not impose, systematic differences across time, industry, and regulator.  We can 
then test whether in fact differences exist.  We view our analysis as exploratory in nature 
and we apply our technique to a database that we assembled from publicly available 
information in Australia.   
 
  3One important finding is that when we examine WACC parameters across decisions in 
six industries, we find almost no consistency across regulatory agencies in Australia, 
giving the impression of regulatory chaos. However, using the proportion of firms' cost 
claims disallowed by the regulator, we find a much greater degree of consistency.  This 
finding of consistency in one dimension but not in another dimension should also be of 
interest to those developing more structural models of the regulatory process, as it 
indicates the kind of stylised facts which such models must be able to accommodate. 
 
We also find systematically different treatment, for both measures, of publicly-owned 
and privately-owned firms after controlling for industry, regulator, and time.  We find no 
political effects as measured by which party is in power in the regulator's jurisdiction.  
We find some evidence that consistency appears to have increased over time.    
 
Our paper is similar in nature to Hagerman and Ratchford (1978) in that we also advance 
a fact-finding approach with the aim of informing the development of theory. It also fits 
with a recent, albeit small, literature that aims to explain the variability of regulatory 
outcomes. Examples include Lehman and Weisman (2000), Figueiredo, Jr. and Edwards 
(2007), and Edwards and Waverman (2006).   
 
Our approach is also similar in sprit to the fact-finding literature that aims at investigating 
whether regulatory outcomes vary with particular aspects of the regulatory regime such 
as whether regulators are appointed or elected. In this vein, Lehman and Weisman (2000) 
find that prices of telecommunication leases are higher in U.S. states with elected public 
utility commissioners. For retail telecommunications and electricity, prices in states with 
elected commissioners are found to be either lower (Besley and Coate, 2003) or not 
statistically significantly different (Primeaux and Mann, 1986) from prices in states with 
appointed commissioners. Using a richer database of regulatory decisions over time, 
Quast (2008) shows that the political affiliation of elected commissioners may be 
correlated with the lease (wholesale) prices that they set. Moreover, he shows that retail 
prices may vary with the political affiliation of appointed regulators.   
 
  4This paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide background on the 
regulatory environment in Australia for the industries we analyse.  In section 3 we 
discuss our alternative measure of consistency and our empirical strategy. Section 4 
describes the database that we assembled and our estimation results.  In that section we 
address our main hypotheses, examine the effect of private ownership, and undertake 
robustness checking of our findings.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.   The Institutional Framework 
The institutional arrangements that prevailed since the deregulation of the network utility 
sectors saw regulatory responsibilities spread between state, territory and national 
regulators.
4  Even within industries, different segments of the supply chain were 
regulated by different regulators and at different jurisdictional levels.  This practice 
resulted in divergent implementations of the underlying principles of price regulation.  
This divergence was a primary motivation for the regulatory reforms that established the 
Australian Energy Regulator, which will take over responsibility for the regulation of 
electricity distribution in most states from 2009 onwards.  
 
The remainder of this section describes the different regulatory frameworks that applied 
for the industry sectors during the period covered in this study.    
Electricity  
Responsibility for electricity regulation in Australia was divided amongst state, territory 
and national regulators since the introduction of deregulation.  As part of the deregulation 
process a National Electricity Market (NEM) was developed.  This market comprises 
Queensland, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory, Victoria and South 
Australia.  Tasmania joined the NEM when the Basslink Interconnector was 
commissioned in April 2006.  Jurisdictions in the NEM were required to regulate the 
                                                 
4 Australia is a federal system with six states and two main self-governing territories, the Northern Territory 
and the Australian Capital Territory.  Australia also has several minor overseas territories which do not 
figure in the analysis presented here.  Governance in the states and territories is identical in relation to the 
regulatory issues presented here and we refer to both generically as 'states' in what follows.     
  5electricity industry according to an industry access code developed under Part IIIA of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974: the National Electricity Code (NEC). 
 
Price regulation under the NEC focused on an incentive-based mechanism that applied a 
CPI-X approach.  The regulation of electricity transmission companies in NEM 
jurisdictions was conducted on a national basis by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) whereas distribution companies were regulated via the 
relevant state-based regulator.   
 
While the ACCC regulated electricity transmission under the NEC, there was sufficient 
scope within the NEC to allow the ACCC to interpret regulatory pricing components in 
different ways. The NEC also allowed state-based regulators to develop alternative 
pricing principles to those set out in the NEC.  As a result, price regulation developed 
differently amongst state-based regulators.  For example, while the NSW regulator 
applied a revenue cap regime, the Victorian regulator applied a price cap regime.    In 
addition, other incentive-based mechanisms of the regime also varied.  For instance, 
Victoria was the only jurisdiction to apply a service incentive scheme and an efficiency 
carryover mechanism.   
 
For those jurisdictions that are outside the NEM, state-based regulation applied for both 
transmission and distribution although there is movement towards regulatory regimes 
similar to the NEM style of price control. 
 
Finally, the ownership profile varies quite dramatically across states. While electricity 
distribution businesses in Victoria and South Australia are privately owned, public 
ownership is the norm across other states. This divergence of ownership profiles is also 
present in electricity transmission.  
Gas 
Gas industry regulation in Australia during the period covered by this study was 
developed under the National Third Party Access Regime for Natural Gas Pipelines (the 
  6Gas Access Regime).
5 This regime applied to third party access to natural gas 
transmission and distribution pipelines.  Unlike for electricity, the Gas Access Regime 
operated in each state and territory through the corresponding gas law.   
 
The Gas Access Regime in Australia only applied to pipelines that were ‘covered’ under 
the regime.  `Covered' pipeline operators were required to have an access arrangement in 
place.  Transmission pipeline access arrangements were the responsibility of the ACCC
 
(except in Western Australia), while distribution pipelines were the responsibility of 
state-based regulators.  The ownership profile (i.e., public versus public ownership) of the 
gas distribution industry is similar to that of electricity although gas transmission is 
characterised entirely by private ownership.  
Water 
Water regulation in Australia is conducted on a state and territory basis with different 
jurisdictional arrangements applying across them. Water pricing decisions typically 
consider bulk water, storm water, and wastewater as well as general water supply 
services.  Water price regulation is conducted under specific state-based water legislation 
with regulatory powers provided through the legislation specific to the regulator. The 
industry is characterised by complex arrangements involving ownership by local councils 
and states of the various segments of the industry. Most water businesses were affected 
by the drought and the imposition of severe water restrictions in many jurisdictions over 
the last five years.  
Rail 
We assembled regulatory decisions for access prices to rail infrastructure by two state 
regulators (Victoria and Queensland).  These are the two states for which data was 
available from the Economic Regulator’s website.  
The Essential Services Commission of Victoria’s objectives under the legislation are to 
ensure that users have fair and reasonable access to declared rail transport services, and to 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Productivity Commission (2004). 
  7ensure that users requiring access to declared rail transport services to provide passenger 
services have priority over users  requiring such access to provide services other than 
passenger services. Tracks are owned by private firms in Victoria. 
In contrast, the rail infrastructure in Queensland was owned by a single government-
owned firm. The state regulator, the Queensland Competition Authority, has a legislated 
duty to assess and approve third party access undertakings to Queensland's intrastate rail 
network; arbitrate access disputes; enforce breaches of access obligations; and assess 
competitive neutrality.  
3. Testing consistency  
This section develops an approach to test the consistency of regulatory decisions across 
jurisdictions and industries, controlling for the effect of time, ownership, and political 
affiliation.  The approach we take may be thought of as asking a broad question, “As an 
outsider, how can I tell if two regulatory decisions are consistent?”  This question is 
obviously of interest to anyone who wishes to analyse whether regulatory reform has 
been successful in increasing consistency.  Here we focus on two specific aspects of this 
broader question:  what should I be testing and how should I be testing it? 
 
Public debate often focuses on specific parameters such as the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC).  We propose an alternative to the WACC, which is the difference 
between a firm’s revenue requirements measured in dollars (Y) and the maximum 
allowable revenue (MAR) as determined by the regulator.








We refer to our variable as PDC (proportion of disallowed claims) for short.  Note that in 
principle we have 0  as in one extreme the regulator can set the maximum 
allowable revenue to exactly cover the firm’s revenue requirement claims 
1
                                                
PDC <<
 
6 We proposed and used this measure in an earlier paper--see Breunig et al. (2006).   That paper did not 
consider any information on political effects and used a pilot data set which was less than half the size of 
the dataset used in this paper.    
  8making . 0 PDC =
7  At the other extreme, the regulator sets the maximum allowable 
revenue to zero making    1. PDC =
' r RD
 
Note that the interpretation of PDC is unlikely to be trivial. If one assumes truthful 
revelation of costs by firms, then PDC could be interpreted as a measure of a firm’s 
deviation from the efficiency frontier; a higher PDC indicating a more inefficient firm.  
By the same token, if firms’ behaviour across industries were the same so that they all 
exaggerated their forecasted future costs, then PDC can be interpreted as a measure of the 
toughness of the regulator, a higher PDC indicating a tougher regulator.   
 
In order to test regulatory consistency we specify a simple model for the regulatory 
parameter (whether it be the WACC or PDC) that depends upon industry, regulator, and 
time.  The model does not depend upon any knowledge of the underlying regulatory 
process.  We also allow for the effect of private ownership and the political party in 
power in the jurisdiction of the regulator. 
 
The model is 
(2) ' ' Priv irt i t irt irt irt z ID TD Labour α βγδ θ λ + + + + + ε   =+
 
 
where z is the variable of interest (WACC or PDC), subscripts irt indicate, respectively, 
the industry, regulator and time of the decision.  RD are dummy variables indicating 
which regulator took the decision, ID are dummy variables representing the industry to 
which the decision applies, TD are dummy variables for the year in which the decision 
was taken, Priv is a dummy variable equal to one when the firm is privately owned (and 
zero otherwise) and Labour is a dummy variable equal to one when a Labour government 
is in power in the regulatory jurisdiction (and zero otherwise).  α , β , γ , δ , θ and λ  are 
(vectors of) parameters to be estimated while  irt ε  is a random term.   
 
                                                 
0. PDC
7 In practice it is possible to observe  <  This can be the result, for example, of the regulator 
allowing the firm to anticipate to period t certain expenses that would be incurred at a later date. 
  9The model may be viewed as a three-way error component model.  Our approach can also 
be viewed as a flexible, non-parametric model where we group the data into cells by time 
period, regulator and industry.  We then calculate means for each cell, which we can use 
to make cross-cell comparisons.  The regression framework allows us to easily conduct 
hypothesis tests for pairs and groups of cells while controlling for ownership and political 
effects. 
 
Finally, we would remind the reader that our objective is not to explain the WACC values 
(nor the values of PDC) but rather to estimate a simple exploratory model that allows us 
to test differences across regulatory decisions in various dimensions. 
4.  Data and results 
The data were obtained by searching the websites of all Australian utility regulators for 
their pricing determinations.  Therefore, the data are limited to those decisions where the 
regulator has provided the information on both the proposal and the determination on the 
Internet.
8  There are 115 decisions, all of which were made since 1998, for which we 
were able to find the required information to construct PDC as described in equation (1) 
above.  Decisions cover three to nine years, with five years being both the average and 
the most common decision length.  Most regulatory decisions report several different 
WACC values; we use the `vanilla' WACC.
 9 
 
Of the 115 decisions in our data base, there are 70 regulatory decisions for which we 
have information on both PDC and the `vanilla' WACC.  Since one objective of the paper 
is to compare the degree of consistency which we find when we use different measures of 
consistency, we focus on this sub-set of 70 decisions for which we can compare the two 
measures.  As a robustness check, we also estimate equation (2) using the full sample of 
                                                 
8 In most cases, the business's proposed revenue requirement and the regulator's maximum allowable 
revenue determination were found in the regulator’s final decision report for that business or industry. In 
some instances, the business's proposed revenue requirements were not available in the final decision. 
When this was the case, the business’s initial submission was used to obtain the data.  WACC parameters 
were not available for all decisions. 
9 This is the WACC value prior to adjustments for taxes and imputation credits.  
  10115 regulatory decisions – but we can only do this for PDC  (See section 4.3 below.).  
We describe the data in section 4.1 and present our main estimation results in section 4.2. 
 
4.1  Descriptive statistics 
Tables 1 to 3 summarise the basic information about the 70 decisions used in estimating 
equation (2) for both WACC and PDC.  Each decision comprises several years and the 
tables also provide information about the 277 annual observations which make up these 
70 decisions.  Appendix tables A1 to A3 provide information about the full sample of 115 
decisions.
10    
 
Table 1 provides the number of observations and decisions for each of the six industries 
for which we have data by the nine regulators covered in our database.  The ACCC is the 
national regulator, and as described in section 2 above, regulated only electricity and gas 
transmission during the period covered by our sample.  Note that half of the decisions in 
our database relate to the water industry and that average values for both the WACC and 
PDC are lowest for that industry.   We discuss the robustness of our results to the 



















                                                 
10 The full database is available 
at http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/staff/flavio_menezes/Regulation_database_with_ownershipv2.xls.  
  11Table 1 
Number of observations (decisions), average PDC (in italics) and  
average vanilla WACC value (in ALGERIAN)  by regulator and industry. 
Regulator
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Tables 2 and 3 describe the decisions relating to privately-owned firms and those relating 
to publicly-owned firms.  From Table 2, we see that all decisions in the water industry 
relate to publicly-owned firms.   In all other industries, we have a mix of privately and 
publicly-owned firms in the data.  Table 3 provides average values for both the WACC 
and PDC by regulator, split by ownership status of the firm.  We see a very small 
difference in average WACC across publicly and privately-owned firms, but PDC is 
twice as large, on average, for privately-owned firms than for publicly-owned firms.  Of 
course, these are average values before we control for any systematic differences across 











  12Table 2 











Transmission  Water Rail  Total 
Public  14 (2)  37 (8)  9 (2)  5 (1)  112 (37)  20 (5)  197 (55) 
Private  15 (2)  25 (5)  26 (5)  11 (2)  0  3 (1)  80 (15) 




Number of observations (decisions), average value of PDC (in italics) and ‘vanilla’ 
WACC (in ALGERIAN) by regulator and public/private ownership 
Regulator
Ownership  ACCC Vic  NSW  QLD  WA  SA  ACT  TAS  NT Total 















































































The only jurisdictions within which there is any variation in political party in power 
during the time period of our data are South Australia, Victoria, and the Australian 
Capital Territory.  Given this lack of variation, the political variable is statistically 
insignificant in the regression models of the next sub-section.    
 
4.2  Regression results 
Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients from the model of equation (2) using the 
WACC parameter as the dependent variable. Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients 
using the average PDC across all years of the decision as the dependent variable.
11  For 
both measures, we find significant differences across the decisions for privately and 
publicly-owned firms in keeping with the descriptive statistics of Table 3 even after 
                                                 
irt
11 For each decision in our data set, we observe one value of the WACC parameter.  Thus equation (2) is 
estimated at the level of the decision.  However, regulators' decisions regarding firms' allowable cost claims 
are spread across multiple years (usually five) so the equation for PDC can be estimated either at the level 
of the decision or at the level of the annual value of PDC.  In the latter case, one would want to allow for 
correlation in ε  as the disallowed cost claims of a firm over different years within the same decision are 
clearly related.   For comparability across measures, we have presented results at the decision level.  A 
model estimated using individual yearly observations with correction for clustering produces substantively 
similar results.  
  13controlling for industry, regulator, and time effects.  Time dummies are included in the 
regressions but are not presented since they are not of particular interest.   
 
Table 4 
Estimated model coefficients 
Dependent variable: 'vanilla' Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
 coefficient  estimate 
(standard error) 
Industry (water is reference category) 
Electricity Transmission  .0082** 
(.0032) 
Electricity Distribution  .0056* 
(.0008) 
Gas Transmission  .013** 
(.0023) 




Regulator (ACCC is reference category) 
Victoria -.023** 
(.0028) 




Western Australia  -.022** 
(.0021) 
South Australia  -.022** 
(.0031) 




Northern Territory  .011** 
(.0037) 
Ownership (publicly owned is reference category) 
Privately owned  .0015* 
(.0009) 
Regression includes time dummies 
** Significant at 5% level 













  14Table 5 
Estimated model coefficients 
Dependent variable: PDC 
 coefficient  estimate 
(standard error) 
Industry (water is reference category) 
Electricity Transmission  -.083 
(.128) 
Electricity Distribution  .090** 
(.039) 
Gas Transmission  -.054 
(.097) 




Regulator (ACCC is reference category) 
Victoria -.145 
(.116) 




Western Australia  -.128 
(.089) 
South Australia  -.158 
(.127) 




Northern Territory  -.289 
(.130) 
Ownership (publicly owned is reference category) 
Privately owned  .102** 
(.035) 
Regression includes time dummies 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
We are primarily interested in the coefficient estimates from Tables 4 and 5 to address 
the question that we pose in this paper:  do we arrive at different conclusions regarding 
regulatory consistency if we use a parameter such as the WACC or if we use the revenue 







  15Table 6 
Hypothesis tests of consistency of the `vanilla' WACC across regulator 
 
     Regulator    
Industry  Vic NSW  QLD WA  SA ACT TAS  NT 
ACCC  .00** .00**  .26  .00** .00** .00**  .23  .00** 
Vic    .00** .00**  .62  .75  .00** .00** .00** 
NSW      .00** .00** .00** .00** .00** .00** 
QLD        .00** .00** .00** .01** .00** 
WA       .88  .00**  .00**  .00** 
SA        .00**  .00**  .00** 
A C T          . 0 0 *   . 7 1  
TAS          .00** 
p-value for test of joint equality between Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia:  .87 
 
Table 6 provides the results of pairwise hypothesis tests across all regulators using the 
regression results from table 4 (the regression model of equation (2) using WACC as the 
dependent variable).  The null hypothesis in each test is that the two regulators behave 
similarly.  The values in the table are the p-values associated with this hypothesis test.  A 
p-value greater than .1 means that we fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 10 per cent 
level.   
 
Strikingly, we find many significantly different coefficients and no patterns of 
consistency across state or national based regulators which correspond to any market 
groupings.  In particular, the NEM members (except neighbours South Australia and 
Victoria) appear to behave differently from one another in a statistically significant way.  
We can conclude that South Australia, Victoria, and Western Australia (as reported in the 
last row of Table 6) can be grouped together but it is difficult to find any economic 
justification for this grouping.   
 
Table 7 provides the results of pairwise hypothesis tests across all regulators using the 
results from table 5 (the model of equation (2) using our proposed measure, PDC).  The 







  16Table 7 
Hypothesis tests of consistency of PDC across regulator 
     Regulator     
Industry  Vic NSW  QLD WA  SA ACT TAS  NT 
ACCC  .22 .53 .11 .16 .22 .69 .29  .03** 
Vic   .01**  .41 .83 .87 .33 .95  .06* 
NSW     .01**  .47 .26 .86 .37  .01** 
QLD        .51 .77 .20 .58 .16 
WA       .75  .48  .91  .14 
SA        .33  .87  .22 
A C T          . 5 0   . 0 6 *  
TAS          .11 
p-value for test of joint equality between Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, South Australia, and Victoria:  0.60 
 
 
The Northern Territory appears to behave quite differently than the other states.  While 
this may perhaps not be surprising given the very low population density and very high 
proportion of remote communities, one should probably not infer too much from these 
results as this coefficient is identified by only one decision!  Dropping it from the model 
has no effect on the other results. 
 
We find a large degree of consistency amongst the state-based regulators, in contrast to 
the impression of regulatory chaos that one gets looking at the WACC results. We fail to 
reject that the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, South Australia, and Victoria 
behave consistently with one another.  The p-value of this test is .6, as reported in the last 
row of Table 7.  This is exactly the type of consistency that one might expect to find 
given the joint participation of these four states in the National Electricity Market (NEM) 
described above in section 2.  We do find that the fifth member of the NEM, New South 
Wales, behaves significantly differently than both Victoria and Queensland, although not 
differently than the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia.   
 
In the robustness checking of section 4.3, below, we explore this divergence of New 
South Wales from its Victorian and Queenslander neighbours and conclude that it may be 
driven by the predominance of water industry decisions in the sub-sample for which we 
have both a measure of PDC and of the WACC.  From Table 1, we see that the average 
PDC in water decisions is six times larger in New South Wales than in Victoria and this 
  17drives the significant difference in the coefficients relating to these two states that we see 
in Table 5. 
   
 Overall, we find a large degree of homogeneity amongst the state regulators and the 
ACCC.  We fail to reject the similarity of any grouping of the ACCC with the state 
regulators provided the grouping excludes New South Wales and the Northern Territory.  
Tables 8 and 9 present the results of the hypothesis tests for consistency across industry 
for the WACC and PDC.  For our measure of relative revenue requirement, we find 
broad consistency across electricity transmission, gas transmission, gas distribution and 
water (Table 9).  Rail and electricity distribution cannot be grouped with the other 
industries.  
Table 8 
Hypothesis tests of WACC consistency across industry 








Transmission  Rail Water 
Electricity 
Transmission  .38 .68  .01**  .74  .00** 
Electricity 
Distribution   .15  .00**  .11  .00** 
Gas Distribution      .00**  .92  .00** 
Gas 
Transmission      .01**  .00** 
Rail         .00** 
p-value for test of joint equality of Electricity Distribution, Electricity Transmission, Gas Distribution, and 
Rail:  .33 
 
Table 9 
Hypothesis tests of PDC consistency across industry 








Transmission  Rail Water 
Electricity 
Transmission  .15 .67 .72  .13  .52 
Electricity 
Distribution   .01**  .13  .72  .02** 
Gas Distribution      .81  .00**  .52 
Gas 
Transmission      .09*  .58 
Rail         .04** 
p-value for test of joint equality of Electricity Transmission, Gas Transmission, Gas Distribution, and 
Water:  .90 
 
  18Table 8 presents the analogous tests for industry consistency for the regression model of 
equation (2) using the WACC parameter as the dependent variable.   Although the 
patterns are slightly different, we find a roughly similar degree of consistency across 
industries when we examine the WACC parameter.  In particular, we find that the 
different WACC values which have been used by regulators across Electricity 
Distribution, Electricity Transmission, Gas Distribution, and Rail are not statistically 
different from one another.   For the WACC parameter, it is water and gas transmission 
that look quite different from the other industries.  
 
4.3 Robustness Checking 
Our hypothesis tests are based upon the premise that a failure to find statistically 
significant differences is evidence of regulatory consistency.  But it could also be that our 
failure to find statistically significant differences is simply a function of small sample 
sizes and large standard errors.  This is a concern mostly for the estimates of table 5 using 
our measure of relative costs allowed by the regulator, PDC.  We find many significant 
differences using the WACC values, as reported in tables 4 and 6. 
 
Fortunately, the sample of data for which we were able to find information about firms' 
cost claims and regulators' decisions is much larger than the sub-sample used in tables 1 
through 9 (where we needed consistent information to compare PDC and WACC).  Our 
full dataset for the PDC variable contains 498 yearly observations on 115 regulatory 
decisions.  Descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix Tables A1 to A3. 
 
In Tables 10 and 11 we present the results of the hypothesis tests for regulatory 
consistency across regulators and industries based upon equation (2) estimated across all 
115 decisions.  These hypothesis tests are based upon a sample size which is 50% larger 
than that upon which tables 7 and 9 are based, giving us more confidence in the 
consistency tests. 
 
In addition to the larger sample size, this group of 115 decisions is spread more evenly 
across industries and less concentrated in decisions relating to water (only 25 per cent of 
  19the decisions in the larger data set relate to water), which is a drawback of our smaller 
dataset that we flagged above.  For all of these reasons, the results we present here are 
our "preferred" results for the PDC variable. 
 
Table 10 presents the results of the hypothesis tests across regulators while Table 11 
presents the hypothesis tests across industries.
12  The basic results presented above are 
confirmed and, in several senses, strengthened.  We find very strong consistency across 
the five states which participate in the National Electricity Market (NEM), with the p-
value of the test of pooling these five states equal to .34.  We also find that Western 
Australia and Queensland, which have similar characteristics, are quite similar.   Only 
Tasmania now stands out as being very different from the other states. 
Table 10 
Hypothesis tests of consistency across regulator 
     Regulator    
Industry  Vic NSW  QLD WA  SA ACT TAS  NT 
ACCC  .04**  .02**  .15 .06* .12 .09*  .00**  .74 
Vic    .18 .25 .28 .82 .74  .00**  .14 
NSW     .06*  .13  .50  .33  .00**  .07* 
QLD        .71  .67  .60 .00** .35 
WA       .50  .46  .00**  .58 
SA        .99  .01**  .29 
ACT         .00**  .23 
TAS          .00** 
p-value for test of joint equality of ACT, Vic, NSW, SA, and Qld:  .34 
 
 
Looking at Table 11, we find consistency across industry of a type that we expect.  The 
two transmission industries--gas and electricity--are quite similar as are the gas and 
electricity distribution industries.  We find that rail can also be easily grouped with the 







                                                 
12 Full regression results are available from the authors.  Results presented here are based upon the 
regression using the average observation of PDC over the full decision period as the dependent variable.  
Regressions estimated using the multiple yearly observations for each decision, with appropriate correction 
of the standard errors for clustering, result in very similar hypothesis tests.  
  20Table 11 
Hypothesis tests of consistency across industry 








Transmission  Rail Water 
Electricity 
Transmission  .02** .01**  .41 .10  .01** 
Electricity 
Distribution   .53  .03**  .33  .06* 
Gas Distribution      .01**  .17  .29 
Gas 
Transmission      .15  .01** 
Rail         .05** 
p-value for test of joint equality of Gas Distribution, Electricity Distribution and Rail: .37 
 
 
Finally, we note that the other results discussed above are unchanged in the larger data 
set.  Regulators still appear to be `tougher' when the decision relates to a privately-owned 
firm than to a publicly owned firm and the difference is statistically significant.  Also, the 
dummy variable for which political party is in power in the regulatory jurisdiction 
remains insignificant.   
 
4.4  Has consistency increased over time? 
In an earlier paper (Breunig et al. 2006), we looked at regulatory consistency in Australia 
over the time period 1997 - 2005 using a data base which was about half as large as the 
one used in this paper.  We considered a smaller subset of industries, only had limited 
information on firm ownership, had no information on political affiliation, and only 
looked at one measure of consistency.  Using PDC, we found consistency among the 
states in south-eastern Australia.  In this paper with a longer sample and larger data set, 
we find increased consistency particularly in the fact that Queensland looks more similar 
to the south-eastern states in the latter part of the period.   This might be interpreted as an 
increase in the amount of regulatory consistency over time. 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
 
In this paper, we have proposed a simple approach to testing for regulatory consistency 
that makes no assumption about the underlying regulatory process.  Estimating a simple 
regression model where regulatory parameters are described (statistically) as a function 
  21of industry, time, and regulator allows us to test consistency in various dimensions and 
permits controlling for other variables such as private ownership or political effects in a 
simple way. 
 
We argue against basing consistency tests solely on parameters such as the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) and instead argue for using the proportion of firms' cost 
claims which are disallowed by the regulator.  We primarily make the case for this 
preference on theoretical grounds.  Similar WACC parameters across regulatory 
decisions are neither sufficient nor necessary for consistent regulatory outcomes.   
Furthermore, it seems reasonable that consistency measures should be based on outcomes 
rather than on inputs.  The WACC parameter is just one input amongst many whereas the 
proportion of firms' cost claims which are disallowed by the regulator is an outcome 
which is determined by a variety of parameters, including the WACC.   
 
In our exploration of regulatory consistency in Australia we find a large degree of 
consistency among the state-based regulators who make up the National Electricity 
Market in eastern Australia when we use our measure of the proportion of firms' cost 
claims which are disallowed by the regulator.  This consistency across state-based 
regulators in eastern Australia accords with our prior beliefs and there is some evidence 
that it is increasing over time.  If we look at the WACC parameter, we find what appears 
to be regulatory chaos.  It is important to note, however, that inconsistency in inputs is 
quite compatible with consistency in outputs.  
 
Irrespective of our prior beliefs, our empirical results cannot be interpreted as favoring 
our measure PDC over the WACC as a measure of regulatory consistency simply 
because we do not know the underlying `true' degree of consistency.  That the two 
measures give fairly different results may be taken as evidence that consistency is best 
thought of as a multi-dimensional concept and that one would want to look at more than 
one measure of consistency. 
 
  22Given that regulatory reform has often cited consistency as an objective, this paper 
provides a framework which can be used to test whether consistency is increasing or 
decreasing over time.  Such testing should not depend upon a detailed knowledge of the 
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Table A1 
Number of observations (decisions) and average value of PDC (in italics)  
by regulator and industry (extended sample of 115 decisions) 
 
Regulator




.162                 83(13) 
.162 
Electricity 






























.135       21(4) 
.244        56(11) 
.176
Water    65(24) 
.011 
33(12) 
.053         27(6) 
.256    125(42) 
.075 
Rail    3(1) 
.377    20(5) 
























Number of observations (decisions) by industry split by publicly/privately owned firm 








Distribution  Gas Distribution  Gas Transmission Water  Rail  Total 
Public  46 (8)  52 (11)  35 (7)  10 (2)  125(42)  20 (5)  288 (75) 
Private  37 (5)  55 (11)  69 (14)  46 (9)  0  3 (1)  210 (40) 




Number of observations (decisions) and average value of PDC (in italics)  
by regulator split by publicly/privately owned firm 
(extended sample of 115 decisions) 
 
Regulator
Ownership  ACCC Vic  NSW QLD  WA  SA  ACT  TAS  NT  Total 




























.113  0 0  210 (40) 
.168 
Total 118(20) 
.154 
148(41) 
.089 
86(23) 
.089 
52(11) 
.064 
31(6) 
.187 
9(2) 
.122 
20(4) 
.107 
30(7) 
.240 
4(1) 
-.055 
498(115) 
.117 
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